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ADMISSION TO BAR DENIED FOR REFUSAL TO ANSWER
QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO COMMUNIST AFFILIATIONS
In re Anastaplo
18 II. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959)
Petitioner passed the Illinois bar examination given in August of 1950
and applied for a certificate of approval from the district Committee on
Character and Fitness.' The committee denied approval because petitioner
refused to answer questions put by the committee as to his possible member-
ship in the Communist Party. Petitioner's motion for admission was denied
by the Supreme Court of Illinois, which held that the committee had not,
as petitioner asserted, abused its discretion nor violated his right of free
speech under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by inquir-
ing into political affiliations.2 The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari.3 Subsequent to the 1957 decisions of the United States Supreme
Court in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,4 and Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners,5 petitioner filed with the Committee on Character and Fit-
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 110, § 259.58 (1951) provides: Section IX. Committee on
Character and Fitness: (1) The Supreme Court shall appoint a Committee on Character
and Fitness in each of the Appellate Court districts of this State.... (2) Before ad-
mission to the bar each applicant shall be passed upon by the Committee in his district
as to his character and moral fitness .... Each applicant shall appear before the Com-
mittee of his district ...and shall furnish the Committee such evidence of his moral
character and good citizenship as in the opinion of the Committee would justify his
admission to the bar. (3) If the Committee is of the opinion that the applicant is of
approved character and moral fitness, it shall so certify to the Board of Law Examiners
and the applicant shall thereafter be entitled to admission to the bar.
2 In re Anastaplo, 3 1ll.2d 471, 121 N.E.2d 826 (1954).
3 In re Anastaplo, 348 U.S. 946 (1955).
4 353 U.S. 252 (1957). Petitioner, an applicant for admission to the California
bar, had submitted considerable evidence of his good moral character. Petitioner's
refusal to answer certain questions about his political associations and beliefs, however,
was held by the state court to justify denying him admission on grounds of poor
moral character. The United States Supreme Court found that during prolonged hear-
ings on Konigsberg's application he was asked many questions as to his political
affiliations and beliefs; these he declined to answer, explaining that his refusal was
based on his understanding that, under the first and fourteenth amendments, a state
could not inquire into such matters. Refusing to decide whether Konigsberg's consti-
tutional objections were well founded the Court noted that "Prior decisions by this
Court indicate that his claim that such questions were improper was not frivolous."
353 U.S. at 270. Consequently the Court held that it was not permissible to draw
unfavorable inferences from his refusal to answer, as to his truthfulness, candor or
general moral character.
r 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Petitioner, an applicant for admission to the New Mexico
bar, submitted strong evidence of his good moral character. The reasons upon which
the state relied as justifying refusal to admit him to practice were somewhat different
from the Konigsberg case. It was shown, among other things, that he had admittedly
been a member of the Communist Party from 1932 to 1940. Upon a consideration of
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ness a supplementary petition for rehearing of his application for admission
to the bar. Following extended hearings6 the committee again denied ap-
proval, framing that denial in accordance with the relevant statutory pro-
visions.7 The Supreme Court of Illinois, on petition from this refusal of
the committee to sign a favorable certificate for admission, held that by
virtue of applicant's refusal to answer questions regarding possible Commu-
nist or other subversive affiliations, he failed to demonstrate the good moral
character and general fitness necessary for admission to the bar.8 The
Supreme Court of the United States has scheduled oral arguments on the
issue in the term beginning next October.9
Power over admission to the bar has long been vested in the judiciary
of each state."' While the legislature may prescribe certain standards, the
state court alone is responsible for determining whether an individual
applicant is qualified for the practice of law within its jurisdiction." The
courts are almost unanimous in holding that admission to the bar is a
privilege and not a right.' 2 Consistent with this view special qualifications
may be established for the bar. The long recognized limitation on this
principle has been that any qualification must be related to a person's fitness
as a lawyer. 13 The United States Supreme Court has held that an applicant
is protected from arbitrary state action in denying admission to the bar
by the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment.1
4
all the circumstances of applicant's birth, upbringing, and current character, the United
States Supreme Court concluded that this fact did not justify a denial of admission
to practice.
I There was no affirmative evidence that Anastaplo had ever been a member of
the Communist Party. Petitioner submitted a number of impressive character affidavits
and letters of reference testifying to his good moral character and general fitness to
practice law. During the investigation by the committee, however, the petitioner had
expressed his belief in the doctrine of revolution and the right of the people to over-
throw the government by force of arms, if necessary. The court concluded that these
views were not necessarily inconsistent with those held by many patriotic Americans,
but that petitioner's refusal to disclose whether he was a Communist made impossible
a determination as to whether the applicant could in good conscience take the attorney's
oath to support and defend the constitutions of the United States and the State of
Illinois.
7 Supra note 1, "good moral character and general fitness to practice law ....
8 In re Anastaplo, 13 Ill.2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959).
9 The New York Times, May 3, 1960 p. 32.
10 Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 13 (1856). Cf. Ohio Rev. Code § 4705.01.
11 In re McBride, 164 Ohio St. 419, 132 N.E.2d 113 (1956), cert. den. 351 U.S.
965 (1956); Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 NE.
650 (1934); State ex rel. Thatcher v. Brough, 15 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 97, aff'd 90 Ohio
St. 382, 108 N.E. 1133 (1914). As to power of legislature respecting admission to bar,
see Annot., 144 A.L.R. 150 (1943).
12 Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84, 116 N.E. 782 (1917) (Cardozo, J.); 7 C.J.S.
"Attorney and Client" § 4(b) (1937).
13 Ex parte Secombe, supra note 10.
14 In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945). Cf. Weiman v. Updegraf, 344 U.S. 183
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In all states the moral character and general fitness of applicants for
the bar must be approved prior to their admission to practice.' 5 These
qualifications have always been deemed essential for an attorney, and it is
the duty of the court to inquire into these matters before admitting
attorneys to the bar.16 The validity of such statutes rests on the need to
insure the courts and the public that the lawyers with whom they are deal-
ing possess such good moral character that they can be trusted and will
uphold the law.17 In passing upon the qualifications of an applicant for
admission to the bar, the 'burden of proving good moral character rests
upon the applicant.' 8
Where on the evidence or lack of evidence presented, the court finds that
it cannot in good conscience grant its approval, the candidate is denied
admission. To the extent that such a denial appears unjustified serious
constitutional questions may be raised. 19 The standards for qualification
cannot be so arbitrary as to have no reasonable relation to fitness.2 0 But
assuming that the standard is such an inoffensive one as "good moral
character," the court may still protect an individual against an arbitrary
application of the standard.21  In the Konigsberg case,22 the majority
adroitly sidestepped a crucial constitutional issue: whether the petitioner
was constitutionally entitled not to answer the questions asked by the
examining committee. 23 Petitioner had premised his refusal to answer on
his freedom of expression as guaranteed by the first amendment operating
through the fourteenth. Until the Supreme Court speaks out on the ques-
tions so adeptly avoided, the full implications of the Konigsberg case will
(1952). The Summers holding was reasserted in Konigsberg, supra note 4, and Schware,
353 U.S. at 238-9, which held that "A state cannot exclude a person from the practice
of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the
Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
15 Rules for Admission to the Bar (West Publishing Co., 33d ed., 1953). See e.g.,
Ohio Supreme Court Rule of Practice XIV and Rules of the Supreme Court of the
United States, Rule II; Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 301 (1959).
16 In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. 492, 89 N.E. 39 (1909); In re Palmer, 15 Ohio
C.C.R. 94, aff'd, 62 Ohio St. 643, 58 N.E 1100 (1900).
17 People ex tel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 I1. 346, 350, 8 N.E.2d 941,
944 (1937); People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919).
18 In re Stepsay, 15 Cal.2d 71, 98 P.2d 489 (1940); Rosencranz v. Tidirington,
193 Ind. 472, 141 N.E. 58 (1923). Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 301 at 311 (1959).
19 Previous to the Konigsberg and Schware decisions, there was a general reluc-
tance on the part of the Supreme Court to consider claims arising under the fourteenth
amendment in state bar admission proceedings. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130 (1872).
20 Cf. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866); Cummings v. Missouri,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
21 Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
22 Supra note 4.
23 Cf. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1958); and Sweezy v. New Hamp-
shire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), regarding freedom of expression before legislative investigat-
ing committees.
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remain open to doubt 2 4 The Konigsberg and Schware opinions imply that a
state's refusal to admit a candidate to the bar violates the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment where there is no basis for a finding that the
applicant has failed to meet the qualifications laid down by the state for
persons seeking to become lawyers. The Konigsberg decision reveals that
where an applicant "in good faith" refuses to answer questions considered
by the examining board to be relevant to a determination of moral fitness,
such refusal can at best be one item of evidence against him and the state
cannot deny its approval when the other evidence before it sufficiently
demonstrates the requisite qualifications for admission to the bar.25
Anastaplo's "good faith" in refusing to answer the questions put to
him by the committee seems unquestionable. None of the information in
the record supported an inference that he lacked good moral character and
the evidence advanced on his behalf was equally, if not more compelling
than that employed by Konigsberg.26 Although the burden of proving good
moral character still rests upon the applicant, in the absence of further
development of the constitutional issues previously mentioned it seems un-
reasonable to say that Anastaplo has not sustained his burden of proof
merely because he relied on his interpretation of his constitutional rights.27
John C. McDonald
24 The opinion in the instant case endeavored to avoid the impact of the Konigs-
berg case by suggesting that it was not a final determination. The dissent points out
that it is not the province of the United States Supreme Court to admit persons to
membership to the bar of any state, but only to determine whether the actions and
standards imposed by the state in bar admission cases infringed constitutional rights.
On remand, the California Supreme Court, over the dissents of Justices Traynor and
Peters, persisted in refusing Konigsberg admission to the bar. Konigsberg v. State Bar
of California, 52 Cal. 2d 769, 344 P.2d 777 (1959). The case is again before the Supreme
Court of the United States. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 4 L.Ed.2d 618, 80 S.
Ct. 661 (1960). Both of these developments arose subsequent to the instant opinion in the
Anastaplo case.
25 353 U.S. at 270-271: The Supreme Court held that as none of the questions
asked by the committee had any relation to the statutory requirements (i.e., good
moral character), his refusal to answer these questions did not evidence his failure to
prove his good moral character. The Bar Committee could not refuse the applicant
on the grounds that he had not sustained his burden of proof in meeting the strict
statutory requirements. "If and when a state makes failure to answer a question an
independent ground for exclusion from the Bar, then this Court will have to determine
whether the exclusion is constitutionally permissible."
26 In re Anastaplo, 18 Ill.2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), Schaefer and Davis, J.J.,
dissenting (unreported): "The record suggests nothing derogatory as to his character
or his reputation. The affirmative showing of good character and reputation is entirely
convincing. . . The applicant possesses the requisite qualifications for admission to
the bar."
27 Supra note 4. Cf. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 48 (1953) (concurring
opinion); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945); West Virginia Board of Edu-
cation v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303-304 (1940); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365-366 (1937).
